Standing Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by O\u27Connor, Michael J.
Penn State Law Review 
Volume 124 Issue 3 Article 4 
6-1-2020 
Standing Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Michael J. O'Connor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/pslr 
Recommended Citation 
O'Connor, Michael J. (2020) "Standing Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act," Penn State Law Review: 
Vol. 124 : Iss. 3 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/pslr/vol124/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at Penn State Law 
eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State Law Review by an authorized editor of Penn State Law 




Standing Under the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act 




The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) provides civil and 
criminal penalties for computer intrusion. Current scholarship seeks to 
determine when a putative defendant has accessed a system without 
authorization. But no academic articles address who can bring suit for the 
intrusion. The system owner seems the natural complainant; after all, the 
CFAA punishes cyber-trespass. But the few courts to address the issue 
thus far have come to a surprising and contrary conclusion: anyone with 
confidential information on the system may bring suit. This turns the 
CFAA from a cyber-trespass statute into a more expansive tool, guarding 
against trade secret theft and other offenses normally governed by very 
different case law. Resolving this question has profound implications in 
an era when confidential documents get routinely stored on Dropbox, 
Google Drive, Amazon Web Services, and similar platforms. This Article 
will examine whether courts are correct to accord such broad standing to 
complainants and whether this comports with the Supreme Court’s views 
on constitutional standing. This Article will also consider whether this 
broad concept of CFAA standing makes sense in light of the statute’s 
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The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) punishes computer 
misuse.1 When a user accesses a system without authorization or exceeds 
their authorization, the user becomes criminally and civilly liable.2 Despite 
dozens of CFAA lawsuits brought each year, courts have left curiously 
unexplored the question of who can bring suit under the CFAA. Most 
would assume that the system owner can bring suit; after all, the cyber-
trespasser broke into their “home.” But the few courts to address the issue 
have cast standing in a much broader fashion. They conclude that the 
statute’s language granting a civil remedy to “[a]ny person who suffers 
damage or loss”3 permits standing not only by system owners, but anyone 
with documents on those systems. Essentially, this transforms the CFAA 
into a law protecting trade secrets, personal privacy, or both. 
This Article will consider whether the current consensus aligns with 
the history, text, structure, and purpose of the CFAA. Part II of this Article 
discusses the CFAA’s history. Part III discusses the limited case law on 
CFAA standing and whether broad standing creates tension with more 
 
1. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reasonably Construing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
to Avoid Overcriminalization, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 19, 2013), https://herit.ag/3aQp2Lb 
(“The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is the federal government’s principal legal 
weapon in the battle to protect computer systems and electronically stored information 
from thieves and vandals.”). 
2. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018). 
3. Id. § 1030(g). 
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established case law on concepts like access and authorization. Part IV 
discusses whether broad CFAA standing satisfies the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional standing jurisprudence. Part V discusses whether Congress 
should revise the current broad approach to CFAA standing to better align 
with either a trespass or digital ownership framework. 
II. HISTORY OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 
The CFAA has evolved throughout its history, but it remains focused 
on punishing those that invade or damage computer systems. The statute 
first arose from popular pressure to combat computer hacking4 and 
concern that existing laws did not cover common hacking crimes.5 
Congress initially limited the law to computers implicating national 
security and financial privacy. Congress later expanded the statute to reach 
all computers in interstate commerce. With cross-state computer delivery 
and the ubiquitous Internet, the CFAA now reaches essentially every 
computer and every computer user in the United States and many outside 
the country’s borders. 
When originally enacted in 1984, Congress limited the CFAA to 
three specific scenarios: “computer misuse to obtain national security 
secrets, computer misuse to obtain personal financial records, and hacking 
into U.S. government computers.”6 In 1986, Congress added interstate 
offenses committed over an interstate computer network.7 The change 
meant little at the time; three decades ago, “when use of the Internet 
remained in its infancy, few crimes would be included in [the statute’s] 
reach.”8 In 1994, the CFAA’s civil provision first appeared.9 It has been 
 
4. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 10 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3689, 3696 (“For example, the motion picture ‘War Games’ showed a realistic 
representation of the automatic dialing and access capabilities of the personal computer.”); 
Patrick S. Ryan, War, Peace, or Stalemate: Wargames, Wardialing, Wardriving, and the 
Emerging Market for Hacker Ethics, 9 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1, 27 (2004) (“Notably, the first 
version of the CFAA was passed shortly after the release of WarGames, almost as if the 
law were drafted to directly address the types of activities carried out by [Matthew 
Broderick’s character] Lightman.”). 
5. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 
3691 (“There is no specific federal legislation in the area of computer crime. Any 
enforcement action in response to computer-related crime must rely on statutory 
restrictions that were designed for other offenses, such as mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341) or 
wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343) statutes. Even if an approach is devised that apparently covers 
the alleged acts in computer-related crimes, it still must be treated as an untested basis for 
prosecution in the federal trial courts.”). 
6. Orin S. Kerr, Cyberspace & the Law: Privacy, Property, and Crime in the Virtual 
Frontier: Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
1561, 1564 (2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(3) (Supp. II 1985)). 
7. See id. at 1565. 
8. Id. 
9. See Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
2097, 2098 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2018)). 
746 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:3 
used for a range of purposes, from employers punishing trade secret 
misappropriation10 to plaintiffs bootstrapping into federal court 
fundamentally state-law claims like trade secret theft and breach of 
contract.11 
In 1996, Congress dramatically expanded the CFAA. Of principal 
interest are two changes to Section 1030(a)(2), now the broadest and most 
commonly used provision for punishing hacking.12 First, the “Federal 
interest” computer protected under the earlier statute was replaced by a 
new category called the “protected computer.”13 Although the prior 
definition covered crimes involving computers in two or more states, the 
“protected computer” included any machine “used in or affecting interstate 
or foreign commerce or communication.”14 With that change, the statute 
reached any computer connected to the Internet.15 Second, Section 
1030(a)(2) went from prohibiting unauthorized access that obtains certain 
sensitive information to prohibiting unauthorized access that obtains any 
information.16 Obtaining information includes merely reading it.17 
The statute has always maintained a strange tension. The law frames 
access and authorization in terms of the computer itself.18 But the actual 
offense requires obtaining information, with the information’s nature 
changing the crime’s severity.19 At one time, with everything from servers 
 
10. See, e.g., WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 
2012); Richard Warner, Symposium, The Employer’s New Weapon: Employee Liability 
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 11 (2008). 
11. See Kelsey T. Patterson, Narrowing It Down to One Narrow View: Clarifying and 
Limiting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 489, 496 (2013) 
(“[A]sserting a claim under a federal statute, such as the CFAA, opens the door to federal 
court.”). 
12. See Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, NEW YORKER (Mar. 18, 2013), 
https://bit.ly/2ReLENS (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c) as “the broadest 
provision”).  
13. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat. 3488, 
3491–92 (1996). 
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2018). 
15. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 1568. Subsequent amendments expanded the “protected 
computer” definition yet again, so it now reaches any computer even “affecting” interstate 
commerce. See id. at 1569–71. Under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, this would 
likely reach every computer, even those lacking any Internet connection. See id. But given 
the Internet’s modern ubiquity, this may mean a legal distinction without practical 
difference.  
16. See id. at 1566–67. 
17. See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 
2484 (explaining that “obtaining information” in statute included “mere observation of the 
data”); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Discount, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 
1276 (N.D. Iowa 2000). 
18. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
1976, 2190 (1984) (“Whoever—(1) knowingly accesses a computer without 
authorization”); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2018) (“Whoever—
(1) having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization”). 
19. See, e.g., Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
1976, 2190 (1984) (“Whoever . . . obtains information that has been determined by the 
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to laptops hosting principally the computer owner’s data, this duality made 
little difference. But now, the server owner and the information owner 
could be totally unrelated, which leads to questions about who can enforce 
the CFAA. 
III. CFAA INJURY 
Without injury, a litigant cannot bring a lawsuit. To determine injury, 
the court looks first to statute or common law: Does the law recognize that 
you were wronged? Particularly when Congress uses vague language at 
odds with the statute’s purpose, this seemingly straightforward analysis 
can require substantial thought about Congress’ intended goals. But even 
when Congress makes clear its intent, the Constitution imposes limits on 
the legislature’s ability to define injury, or at least the federal courts’ 
ability to redress it. 
The CFAA implicates both these tests. Congress chose to permit civil 
claims by “any person who suffers damage or loss” due to actions violating 
the CFAA.20 This seems to open the door for claims not only by system 
owners, but anyone with data on the system. But Congress also intended 
to craft a cyber trespass statute, and premised liability on lack of 
authorization as determined by the system owner. This creates a disconnect 
between the standing inquiry and the liability inquiry. These seemingly 
untethered results raise legitimate questions about whether Congress 
intended such broad standing. 
A. Current CFAA Standing Case Law 
Every day, more people utilize cloud services like Dropbox, Google 
Docs, and Microsoft OneDrive to store their files.21 The benefits are 
obvious: ubiquitous data access from every device you own.22 The CFAA 
 
United States Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection 
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations”); 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2018) (“Whoever . . . having 
obtained information that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant 
to an Executive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for 
reasons of national defense or foreign relations”).  
20. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2018). 
21. See, e.g., Kevin Curran, Can Dropbox Keep Its Paid User Growth Momentum 
Going?, REAL MONEY (Aug. 10, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://bit.ly/2vUv1iR (“Dropbox Inc.’s 
(DBX) paid users grew to 11.9 million in the second quarter, up 400,000 from the prior 
quarter and 1 million from the prior year quarter.”). 
22. See Easy File Syncing, DROPBOX, https://bit.ly/3bxT8Di (last visited April 30, 
2020) (“Save a file to the Dropbox folder on your computer, and it’s synced automatically 
to your mobile device.”). 
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case law is slowly moving to reflect this new reality, with more cases 
brought by account or document owners against trespassers.  
In Theofel v. Farey-Jones, a civil litigant “used a ‘patently unlawful’ 
subpoena to gain access to e-mail stored by [the opposing parties’] Internet 
service provider.”23 When the opposing parties learned that the Internet 
service provider (“ISP”) had turned over their e-mails without notice from 
either the litigant or the ISP, they sued under the Wiretap Act, the Stored 
Communications Act, and the CFAA.24 The district court dismissed the 
CFAA claim “on the theory that the Act does not apply to unauthorized 
access of a third party’s computer.”25 But the Ninth Circuit disagreed, 
holding that the CFAA extends to third-party computers:  
The district court erred by reading an ownership or control requirement 
into the Act. The civil remedy extends to “[a]ny person who suffers 
damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section.” . . . Individuals 
other than the computer’s owner may be proximately harmed by 
unauthorized access, particularly if they have rights to data stored on 
it.26  
District courts across three other circuits have also addressed the point, 
and unanimously agree with Theofel that third-party computer ownership 
poses no obstacle to a CFAA claim.27 
Congress manifests its intent through statutory text. The courts’ role 
is to faithfully apply that text: “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the 
sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the 
text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”28 But individual 
statutory provisions must not be isolated from the rest.29 We should read a 
 
23. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2003). 
24. See id. at 981–82. 
25. Id. at 986. 
26. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2018)). 
27. See, e.g., Phillips Med. Sys. Puerto Rico, Inc. v. GIS Partners Corp., 203 F. Supp. 
3d 221, 230 (D.P.R. 2016) (“Moreover, ‘[i]ndividuals other than the computer’s owner’ 
may bring an action under the CFAA because they ‘may be proximately harmed by 
unauthorized access, particularly if they have rights to data stored on [the computer].’” 
(citing Theofel, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078)); Océ N. Am., Inc. v. MCS Servs., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 
2d 481, 487 (D. Md. 2010) (“Plaintiff correctly cites to Theofel v. Farey-Jones for the 
proposition that it does not need to own the ‘protected computer’ in order to claim damages 
for a violation of the CFAA[.]”); Nexans Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 
468, 472–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that confidential document owner could enforce 
CFAA when stolen documents stored on business partner’s server, but finding loss 
insufficient to trigger CFAA private-action threshold), aff’d, 166 F. App’x 559 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
28. Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004). 
29. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“In 
determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, a reviewing 
court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. 
The meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when 
placed in context.”). 
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statute to “fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.”30 And the 
broad view of standing creates tension with the concept of authorization 
under the CFAA. 
B. Tensions With “Access” and “Authorization” 
Congress cannot criminalize every interaction with a computer, so 
the CFAA contains a gating concept: it punishes “access[] . . . without 
authorization[.]”31 The circuits have deeply split over how to define 
“authorization,” but every circuit tethers the concept to permission from 
the system owner. If we link “authorization” to the system owner but give 
broad standing to anyone injured, that disconnect injects both substantive 
and practical uncertainty into CFAA litigation. 
1. Current Approaches to Authorization 
The CFAA punishes whoever “intentionally accesses a computer 
without authorization or exceeds authorized access.”32 In its wisdom, 
Congress defined neither “access” nor “authorization.”33 Surprisingly, 
 
30. FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959); see also Davis v. Mich. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory 
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to 
their place in the overall statutory scheme.”); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of 
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). As the Supreme Court explains in 
Mandel Brothers, this “harmonious whole” rule does not apply for penal statutes, which 
“deserve[] strict construction.” Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. at 389. In addition, while the CFAA 
contains both civil and criminal provisions, it generally uses the same standards to 
determine when an offense occurred. Because the same words in the same section of the 
same statute cannot be read two different ways—one way when the government brings 
criminal charges and another when a plaintiff brings a civil complaint—due process 
requires strict construction. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (“Because 
we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a 
criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”). The civil-action provision 
seems one of the few elements in the entire statute that will only be encountered outside 
the criminal context, and thus can be viewed through an alternative lens. 
31. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2018). 
32. Id. Similar language appears throughout the statute, but subsection (a)(2) is the 
broadest and most frequently charged provision. 
33. See id. § 1030(e) (defining neither “access” nor “without authorization”); see also 
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(“Congress did not define the phrase ‘without authorization,’ perhaps assuming that the 
words speak for themselves. The meaning, however, has proven to be elusive.”). Congress 
may have left the statute intentionally ambiguous; by sacrificing precision for flexibility, a 
single statute can apply to the many ways that individuals abuse computers. See Greg 
Pollaro, Disloyal Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Narrowing the 
Scope, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 012, ¶ 10 (2010) (“Congress decided early in the 
CFAA’s history that it wanted a single statute to cover the field of computer crime ‘rather 
than identifying and amending every potentially applicable statute affected by advances in 
computer technology.’ The price for this legislative expediency is that one relatively brief 
statute is applied to a range of disparate activities such as fraud, trespass, spam, phishing, 
worms, viruses and denial of service attacks. This has inevitably forced square pegs into 
round holes.”). 
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Congress did define “exceeds authorized access,” explaining that it means 
to access a computer with authorization and then transgress that 
authorization’s boundaries.34 
Left with little statutory guidance, courts and scholars have spun 
numerous tests and theories for access and authorization. This Article 
organizes those approaches into four groups: (1) International Airport 
Centers, LLC v. Citrin’s agency approach; (2) the use contract approach; 
(3) the access contract approach; and (4) the code-based approach. 
Citrin’s agency approach premises liability on loyalty.35 Defendant 
Jacob Citrin decided to breach his non-compete agreement with his current 
employer and wiped his work laptop to impede his employer’s 
investigation.36 Citrin’s employer, International Airport Centers (“IAC”), 
sued under the CFAA for this “damage.”37 IAC had issued this laptop to 
Citrin. But while IAC permitted Citrin to use it for the company’s benefit, 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that IAC’s authorization lapsed when Citrin 
decided to use (or abuse) it for his own benefit.38 Setting aside intentional 
misconduct, employees are neither automatons nor indentured servants. 
Minds wander. People find new jobs. They should not incur criminal 
liability every time they read the news on their work computer or find 
themselves mildly less productive in their last few weeks on the job.  
Seemingly uncomfortable with cabining criminal liability only by the 
loose concept of agency, no other circuits have adopted Citrin’s unalloyed 
reliance on that doctrine. Every other circuit, except the Ninth, bases 
CFAA liability on violating contracts and terms of service. But the 
contracts do not merely specify the times, circumstances, and methods by 
which a user can access the system; they often specify what a user can do 
after they access it. This turns an anti-hacking statute into a general license 
to combat bad behavior. 
For example, in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., the First 
Circuit concluded that using proprietary data to inform the method by 
which a party accessed a public website would likely “exceed[] authorized 
 
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2018) (“[T]he term ‘exceeds authorized access’ means to 
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information 
in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”). 
35. See Int’l Airport Ctrs. LLC, v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006). 
36. See id. 
37. See id. at 420 (citing Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) (2018)). 
38. See id. (“[Citrin’s] authorization to access the laptop terminated when, having 
already engaged in misconduct and decided to quit IAC in violation of his employment 
contract, he resolved to destroy files that incriminated himself and other files that were the 
property of his employer, in violation of the duty of loyalty that agency law imposes on an 
employee.” (citing United States v. Galindo, 871 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir.1989); Shurgard 
Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124–25 (W.D. 
Wash. 2000); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 112, 387 (1958))). 
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access.”39 There, all the pages accessed were publicly available,40 but the 
First Circuit explained that using the data while navigating the website 
“reeks of use—and, indeed, abuse—of proprietary information that goes 
beyond any authorized use of EF’s website.”41 Similarly, based on a 
Citigroup policy restricting how employees use customer information, the 
Fifth Circuit upheld Dimetriace Eva-Lavon John’s CFAA conviction for 
passing confidential customer account information to her confederates in 
a fraud ring.42 Additionally, in United States v. Drew, the U.S. 
Government advocated criminal CFAA prosecution for violating website 
terms of service.43 The district judge concluded that the website terms were 
too vague to inform the defendant that violating them would strip her 
authorization to use the site,44 but the position remains a logically 
consistent application of the use contract approach. 
Courts have criticized the use contract approach as misapplying the 
CFAA’s text45 and creating an endlessly malleable criminal law46 similar 
to the agency approach. Any employee that violates an employer’s trust or 
its computer-use policy could end up behind bars. Calling a family 
member from their work phone, checking scores on ESPN.com, or playing 
Sudoku online all result in potential tickets to jail.47 Responsive to these 
textual and practical concerns, some courts hold that while the CFAA does 
not criminalize improper use, improper access falls within its reach. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Rodriguez 
arguably originated the access contract theory.48 In that case, Rodriguez 
 
39. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582–84 (1st Cir. 
2001). 
40. The First Circuit conceded this point in a later companion opinion. See EF 
Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[I]t appears that 
the codes could be extracted more slowly by examining EF’s webpages manually, so it is 
far from clear that Zefer would have had to know that they were confidential. The only 
information that Zefer received that was described as confidential (passwords for tour-
leader access) apparently had no role in the scraper project.”). 
41. Explorica, 274 F.3d at 583. 
42. See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 269–71 (5th Cir. 2010). 
43. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
44. See id. at 464–66. 
45. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858–64 (9th Cir. 2012). 
46. See id. at 862 (“Not only are the terms of service vague and generally unknown–
unless you look real hard at the bottom of a webpage–but website owners retain the right 
to change the terms at any time and without notice. . . . Accordingly, behavior that wasn’t 
criminal yesterday can become criminal today without an act of Congress, and without any 
notice whatsoever.”). 
47. See id. at 860 (“Employees who call family members from their work phones will 
become criminals if they send an email instead. Employees can sneak in the sports section 
of the New York Times to read at work, but they’d better not visit ESPN.com. And sudoku 
enthusiasts should stick to the printed puzzles, because visiting www.dailysudoku.com 
from their work computers might give them more than enough time to hone their sudoku 
skills behind bars.”). 
48. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260–63 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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received repeated, explicit warnings to access Social Security records only 
when necessary for his job.49 He ignored those warnings and delved into 
files for romantic partners, friends, acquaintances, and strangers.50 
Rejecting the use contract approach,51 the Eleventh Circuit held that 
because Rodriguez had accessed files beyond his purview, his use was 
irrelevant.52 While the access contract approach seems more defensible 
than the use contract approach, the result often turns on labeling, not 
substance, rendering the line between the two approaches “illusory.”53 
Indeed, the court in United States v. Drew considered the MySpace Terms 
of Service as a constraint on access and would have permitted them on that 
basis, even though ultimately finding them void for vagueness.54 Some 
conclude that such malleability provides insufficient notice. They argue 
that accessors only lack authorization when they bypass authentication 
gates using a stolen password, software exploit, or similar method.55 
 
49. See id. at 1260–62. 
50. See id. 
51. Courts and scholars often group Rodriguez with John (the use contract case). See, 
e.g., Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862 (classifying Rodriguez with Citrin and John); Patricia L. Bellia, 
A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1452 n.51 (2016) (classifying Rodriguez with John, but 
not Citrin). But Rodriguez explicitly differentiated itself from John. See Rodriguez, 628 
F.3d at 1263. 
52. See Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263 (“[Rodriguez’s] use of information is irrelevant 
if he obtained the information without authorization or as a result of exceeding authorized 
access.”). 
53. Bellia, supra note 51, at 1454–55 (“Some courts have enforced restrictions on 
access that attempt to incorporate restrictions on use. For example, an employer may state 
that its employees have access to a confidential database for a specific purpose and that 
access to the database for any other purpose is not permitted. . . . Under such an approach, 
liability under the CFAA turns on whether an employer that seeks to restrict its employees’ 
use of confidential information happens to incorporate the use restriction into its policy on 
access. The line between ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ views becomes illusory.”); see also 
Jonathan Mayer, The Narrow Interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A User 
Guide Applying United States v. Nosal, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1644, 1659 (2016) (“That 
is not to say that the access-use dichotomy is a paragon of doctrinal clarity.”). 
54. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“Clearly, the 
MSTOS was capable of defining the scope of authorized access of visitors, members and/or 
users to the website.”). 
55. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 
2173 (2004) (“I . . . demonstrate that courts should apply the federal Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act only when a system owner uses strong technical measures to control access, and 
argue that courts have too broadly interpreted that statute by allowing system owners to 
invoke it to enforce terms of use and other weak forms of notice.”); Bellia, supra note 51, 
at 1475 (“[A] code-based approach to the CFAA offers a number of advantages.”); Orin S. 
Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1164 (2016) (“In my view, 
an authentication requirement draws the proper line.”); Patterson, supra note 11, at 528 
(“[C]ourts should expressly adopt a code-based approach to [the CFAA’s] interpretation.”). 
But see Mayer, supra note 53, at 1670 (“There is much to commend the code-based 
standard of liability, for example, and the Author’s own preference is that Congress 
implement a version of that approach. . . . Much as the code-based test holds appeal, it 
simply cannot be squared with the statute.”). 
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Until very recently, no court had accepted this code-based approach 
for the CFAA.56 The Ninth Circuit changed that in HiQ Labs, Inc. v. 
LinkedIn Corp., adopting the position that liability attaches only when one 
bypasses an authentication gate.57 HiQ Labs concluded that when a system 
owner revokes a user’s access, the system owner does not (and seemingly 
cannot) prohibit access to portions of the website located outside an 
authentication gate.58 Rather, the system owner’s cease-and-desist 
prohibits the user from creating new accounts or using an existing account 
to reach through an authentication gate.59 
2. Textual Tensions 
Both the access contract approach and the code-based approach 
recognize that the statute tethers authorization to access.60 The question is 
not whether some aspect of the user’s interaction with the system was 
unwanted by the owner, but whether their access was unwanted.61 And all 
 
56. See The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Circuit Split and Efforts to Amend, U. 
CAL. BERKELEY SCH. L.: BTLJ BLOG (Mar. 31, 2014), https://bit.ly/2WEA6H6 (“No court 
has adopted the code-based interpretation of the CFAA.”). 
57. See HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 17-16783, slip op. at 29 (9th Cir. Sept. 
9, 2019) (suggesting that “authorization is only required for password-protected sites or 
sites that otherwise prevent the general public from viewing the information”). 
58. See id. at 30–31. 
59. See id. 
60. See, e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2018) 
(imposing criminal liability on one who “intentionally accesses a computer without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access”); Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 
610, 619 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting Clinton Plumbing & Heating v. Ciaccio, No. 09-2751, 
2010 WL 4224473, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2010)) (“These [use contract] rulings wrap the 
intent of the employees and use of the information into the CFAA despite the fact that the 
statute narrowly governs access, not use. . . . Subjective intent departs from the original 
view that the CFAA concerns what is ‘tantamount to trespass in a computer.’”); H.R. REP. 
No. 98-894, at 20 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3706 (“Section 1030 
deals with an ‘unauthorized access’ concept of computer fraud rather than the mere use of 
a computer. Thus, the conduct prohibited is analogous to that of ‘breaking and entering’ 
rather than using a computer (similar to the use of a gun) in committing the offense.”); 
David J. Schmitt, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Should Not Apply to the Misuse of 
Information Accessed With Permission, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 423, 432 (2014) (“The 
CFAA was aimed at ‘outside hackers’ who improperly access protected computers, and 
‘inside hackers’ who have permission to use protected computers but obtain information 
beyond the permission that had been granted.”). 
61. An earlier version of the statute considered use. See Counterfeit Access Device 
and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473 § 2102, 98 Stat. 2190, 
2190-91 (1984) (“Whoever . . . knowingly accesses a computer without authorization, or 
having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides 
for purposes to which such authorization does not extend . . . .”). But Congress abandoned 
that approach, strongly suggesting that it did not intend to criminalize improper use. See 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS § 40 (2012) (“Reenactment Canon. If the legislature amends or reenacts a provision 
other than by way of a consolidating statute or restyling project, a significant change in 
language is presumed to entail a change in meaning.”); Samantha Jensen, Comment, 
Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why Broad Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 
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the approaches consider authorization at the system level, rather than the 
document or data level. The CFAA itself strongly suggests these linkages 
among access, authorization, and the computer itself: “Whoever—(1) 
having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization . . . .”62 
Admittedly, in many situations, the system owner cannot be easily 
identified.63 With dedicated servers, “you lease an entire server from your 
hosting company.”64 With virtual servers, you get the appearance of an 
entire computer to yourself, but in reality you are working within a 
software-created sandbox on a computer that may host many similar 
sandboxes.65 With normal Internet accounts like an e-mail account, you 
abandon even the pretense of having your own computer; you have only 
limited access to a single application. But system ownership and data 
ownership are completely different concepts, and the CFAA ties access 
and authorization to system ownership. 
This creates tension with the broad standing articulated in Theofel.66 
Both the plain statutory language and every circuit’s approach hold that 
the system owner can authorize or withhold access. For that reason, the 
system owner is arguably the only person harmed when a hacker breaks in 
without authorization or a user transgresses their granted authorization’s 
boundaries. But Theofel grants standing to sue even where a person had 
no authority to permit—or, more importantly, to withhold—access. 
This generates a notable discontinuity between the statute’s 
gatekeepers and its enforcers, which raises both practical and substantive 
concerns. From a practical aspect, the system owner would be a stranger 
to the litigation. They would be forced to produce documents and testify 
only under the deferential standard applied to third parties. In civil cases, 
this requires that the litigants “avoid imposing undue burden or expense” 
on the system owner.67 Litigants will find it more difficult to prove how 
the system owner communicated authorization or prohibition. 
Documenting access may require records that are unavailable to the parties 
themselves. On the substantive side, broad standing suggests that the 
 
36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 125 (2013) (“Agency and contract-based interpretations are 
incorrect because persistent incorporation of ‘use’ flagrantly returns the CFAA to a version 
Congress has expressly revoked.”). 
62. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2018). 
63. Cf. Mayer, supra note 53, at 1651–53 (suggesting the problems with drawing 
boundaries around systems). 
64. See Colocation Pricing (The 2020 Definitive Guide), DIG. SERV. CONSULTANTS 
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://bit.ly/39l0xV1. 
65. See Server Virtualization, PCMAG, https://bit.ly/2UxIdCC (last visited May 4, 
2020) (“Running applications in separate, isolated partitions (separate ‘virtual machines’) 
within a single server. Widely used in enterprise and cloud computing datacenters, each 
virtual machine (VM) runs its own OS and applications and can be moved or copied from 
one server to another for load balancing or to expand processing capability.”). 
66. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2003). 
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(1). 
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statute was intended to protect digital property generally. But the 
legislative history, case law, and scholarship all suggest that the CFAA is 
fundamentally a cyber-trespass statute, which raises the question whether 
Theofel and the other courts adopting its approach have given sufficient 
thought to the zone of interests that Congress intended to protect. 
C. Statutory Standing 
Just as rules of construction determine who must obey a statute, 
similar rules determine who can bring suit. Among these rules are the 
“zone of interests” test and proximate causation.68 
1. Zone of Interests 
Statutory causes of action extend to plaintiffs whose complaints “fall 
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.”69 We must, 
therefore, ask what interests Congress intended the CFAA to protect. The 
text, structure, and history of the CFAA all suggest that Congress was 
enacting a cyber-trespass law. 
The statutory text suggests trespass by using the terms “access” and 
“authorization,”70 both drawn from physical trespass.71 Meanwhile, the 
legislative history indicates that Congress was concerned with computer 
break-ins. As explained above, the CFAA was a direct reaction to popular 
media depicting hackers trespassing into sensitive government systems.72 
Indeed, the Senate Report explains that Congress was concerned that 
hacking was being shoehorned into inappropriate causes of action like 
“theft, embezzlement or even the illegal conversion of trade secrets.”73 In 
light of this evidence, both courts and scholars have recognized that 
Congress was enacting a cyber-trespass law.74 Indeed, in the earliest 
 
68. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128–
33 (2014). While these tests were often referred to as determining “prudential standing,” 
in Lexmark, the Supreme Court clarified that they are tools aiding statutory interpretation. 
See id. at 127.  
69. Id. at 129 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
70. See, e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2018). 
71. See, e.g., Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Framework for the Crime 
of Hacking, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1478 (“The text, structure, and history of the 
CFAA all indicate that its ‘without authorization’ term incorporates preexisting physical 
trespass rules.”); Kerr, supra note 55, at 1146 (“[C]oncepts of authorization rest on trespass 
norms.”). 
72. See supra Part II. 
73. S. REP. No. 99–432, at 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2491. 
74. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 
2016) (“The CFAA prohibits acts of computer trespass by those who are not authorized 
users or who exceed authorized use.”); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. 
Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 495 (D. Md. 2005) (“Federal courts interpreting 
[SECA and the CFAA] have noted that their general purpose . . . was to create a cause of 
action against computer hackers (e.g., electronic trespassers).” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Goldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 71, at 1478; Kerr, supra note 55, at 1146. 
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significant CFAA case, the Second Circuit referred repeatedly to the 
CFAA as punishing “trespass.”75 
Thus, it seems prudent to determine the CFAA’s zone of interests by 
reference to trespass law.76 Trespass law does not permit those storing 
property in a place to bring suit for trespass; only the “possessor” of the 
land may bring suit.77 This makes sense because trespass violates the 
possessor’s right to quiet enjoyment in their land. By the same token, 
cyber-trespass violates the computer owner’s right to quiet enjoyment, 
requiring that they expend money, time, and stress expelling the invaders 
and barricading against their repeated entry. Therefore, it seems 
questionable to extend the CFAA’s zone of interests to those that do not 
own the server, do not lease it, do not grant or restrict access to it, and are 
not responsible for preventing or remediating attacks. 
2. Proximate Cause 
For determining statutory standing, proximate cause operates 
similarly to its operation in tort. There it has been called “a well 
established principle of [the common] law, that in all cases of loss we are 
to attribute it to the proximate cause, and not to any remote cause.”78 
Proximate cause “excludes only those ‘link[s] that [are] too remote, purely 
contingent, or indirect.’”79 Remoteness and directness require a particular 
examination here. 
Considering remoteness, the proximate cause inquiry turns 
principally on foreseeability: Could a reasonable tortfeasor have expected 
the damage and resultant liability that occurred from their conduct?80 Here, 
the CFAA neatly demonstrates the difference between the “zone of 
interests” test and the proximate cause analysis. As a cyber-trespass 
statute, the CFAA deters breaching and damaging computer systems. But 
although the zone of interests extends to the servers themselves, certainly 
accessing and damaging documents on those servers was foreseeable. 
 
75. See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1991). 
76. See, e.g., Michael J. O’Connor, The Common Law of Cyber-Trespass, 85 BROOK. 
L. REV. 421 (2020) (applying trespass law to resolve open questions in CFAA 
interpretation); Goldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 71, at 1478 (advocating incorporating 
trespass standards into CFAA interpretation). 
77. See, e.g., Beach St. Corp. v. A.P. Constr. Co., 658 A.2d 379, 380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1995) (“It is well-settled that any right to sue for the trespass belongs solely to the possessor 
at the time of the trespass[.]”); Smith v. Cap Concrete, Inc., 184 Cal. Rptr. 308, 310 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1982) (“The proper plaintiff in an action for trespass to real property is the person 
in actual possession; no averment or showing of title is necessary.”). 
78. Waters v. Merchants’ Louisville Ins. Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 213, 223 (1837). 
79. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419 (2011) (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. 
City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)). 
80. See, e.g., Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 997 (Ind. 1991) (“[Proximate cause] 
seek[s] to find what consequences of the [alleged] conduct should have been foreseen by 
the actor who engaged in it.”). 
2020 STANDING UNDER THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 757 
But when we consider derivative protection, the picture gets murkier. 
Recall that the plaintiff’s injury in the Theofel context stems from 
documents read or damaged by third parties. But the plaintiff brings a 
cause of action not for trade secret theft or any other cause that vindicates 
the plaintiff’s rights in those documents themselves. Rather, the 
documents are merely the damage that permits the plaintiff to protect the 
server owner’s property rights. Proximate cause suggests that this might 
be “purely derivative of ‘misfortunes visited upon a third person by the 
defendant’s acts.’”81 
Our conclusion is thus somewhat muddled. The CFAA’s plain 
language is deceptively expansive, promising recompense to anyone 
damaged by violations. But the zone-of-interests test suggests that 
Congress intended to protect system owners from cyber-trespass, not data 
owners from trade secret theft (which was already universally protected at 
the state level). Meanwhile, proximate causation suggests that the 
document owner’s harm was foreseeable to the wrongdoer, but that the 
plaintiff’s claim may derive from the system owner’s. 
There is another factor to consider. Recent case law questions 
whether digital privacy invasions cause harm at all. If merely “obtain[ing] 
. . . information”82 causes no harm, then the Constitution interposes an 
obstacle. The federal courts cannot remedy injuries that do not exist. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING 
The federal judiciary does not offer advice.83 Instead, the Constitution 
empowers it to decide “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies.”84 By including that 
constitutional requirement, the Framers made a practical and moral 
judgment about the “proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in 
a democratic society.”85 On the practical axis, directly impacted litigants 
can present a more complete factual picture to illuminate the legal issues.86 
On the moral axis, when courts can only resolve disputes between litigants 
with a direct stake in the outcome, this limitation blunts the courts’ ability 
 
81. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 133 
(quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268–69 (1992)). 
82. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2018). 
83. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (“[N]o justiciable 
controversy exists when parties . . . ask for an advisory opinion[.]”); Clinton v. Jones, 520 
U.S. 681, 700 (1997) (“[T]he judicial power to decide cases and controversies does not 
include the provision of purely advisory opinions to the Executive, or permit the federal 
courts to resolve nonjusticiable questions.”). 
84. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.  
85. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
86. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220–21 
(1974) (“Concrete injury . . . enables a complainant authoritatively to present to the court 
a complete perspective upon the adverse consequences flowing from the specific set of 
facts undergirding his grievance.”). 
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to legislate by injunction.87 Citizens with broad, abstract, or vague 
objections about the government’s goals and operation can address their 
concerns to the representative branches. If those branches prove 
recalcitrant, citizens replace them every two, four, or six years.88 If we 
change this essential allocation of power between the representative and 
the judicial branches, we risk diminishing both.89 
A court therefore decides a dispute between parties. The court issues 
a judgment. Someone wins and someone loses. The court may award 
damages. It may issue an injunction. Regardless, the court resolves the 
parties’ dispute and clarifies their rights and obligations going forward. 
The court’s opinion is an extraneous adjunct to this process.90 While useful 
for helping appellate courts determine whether the judgment was correct 
and for clarifying the law going forward, the opinion does not do anything. 
It explains why the judgment did the correct thing. 
Constitutional standing emerges from these ideas. It says that a case 
or controversy cannot exist in a vacuum. Rather, it emerges from 
interactions between parties. Indeed, cases and controversies only exist in 
relation to those parties. For example, assume that John Smith believes 
Adam Brown stole his patented idea. John Smith has a dispute with Adam 
Brown, and Adam Brown has a dispute with John Smith. Assuming 
several other requirements get satisfied, a court could issue a judgment 
favoring one or the other. The court could resolve their case. But other 
than being annoyed by their dull, overused names, Hixby Higginbotham 
has no dispute with John Smith or Adam Brown. A case exists, but he 
plays no part in it. 
 
87. See id. (“To permit a complainant who has no concrete injury to require a court 
to rule on important constitutional issues in the abstract would . . . open the Judiciary to an 
arguable charge of providing ‘government by injunction.’”). 
88. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“In a very real sense, 
the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the 
argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and 
ultimately to the political process. . . . The Constitution created a representative 
government with the representatives directly responsible to their constituents at stated 
periods of two, four, and six years; that the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy 
does not, of course, completely disable the citizen[.]”).  
89. See id. at 188–89 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (“Relaxation of standing 
requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial power. . . . [R]epeated and 
essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the representative 
branches will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public confidence essential 
to the former and the vitality critical to the latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-
restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the actions of the other branches. We 
should be ever mindful of the contradictions that would arise if a democracy were to permit 
general oversight of the elected branches of government by a nonrepresentative, and in 
large measure insulated, judicial branch.”). 
90. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (“The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or 
otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court’s 
judgment may benefit others collaterally.”). 
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For that reason, constitutional standing demands three elements: (1) 
an injury to the party demanding redress; (2) a causal connection between 
the injury and the defendant’s conduct; and (3) a likelihood that a 
favorable decision will redress the injury.91 By no coincidence, even the 
simplest lawsuit has three actors: the injured plaintiff, the injuring 
defendant, and the court addressing the injury. Standing’s three elements 
ensure that these three players have a sufficient connection to the dispute 
such that a case or controversy exists, not merely in the abstract, but 
regarding these specific actors. 
A. Injury-in-Fact 
The injury requirement ensures that the plaintiff bringing the claim 
has been wronged in such a way to give rise to a case or controversy.92 The 
injury requirement itself has three sub-requirements. The injury must be 
“particularized.”93 It must be “concrete.”94 And it must be “actual or 
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”95 Particularization ensures 
that the harm “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”96 It 
presents no serious obstacle to the CFAA fact patterns here, with plaintiffs 
alleging that breachers accessed their personal confidential information. 
But several courts have suggested that current data breach harms are not 
concrete and future data breach harms are solely hypothetical. 
1. Present Injury 
Injuries can be either tangible—like a rock dropping on one’s head—
or intangible—like a metaphorical rock dropping on one’s head.97 But 
standing permits only “concrete” harms.98 Though all tangible harms are 
concrete, only some intangible harms will qualify. The concreteness 
analysis thus determines which metaphorical rocks still cause injury. This 
test has two strands: history and legislative choice. 
The historical analysis looks to similar claims that have been 
traditionally accepted in English and American common law.99 Where an 
injury has been long recognized, the courts will continue to offer standing 
 
91. See Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 338 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
92. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 502 (“Petitioners must allege and show that they 
personally have been injured.”). 
93. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 560 n.1. 
97. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 772, 774 (1985) (“[T]he term ‘intangible injuries’ most often is used to refer 
to nonphysical injuries[.]”). 
98. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
99. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
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for that injury. The legislature may still remove legal redress for the injury, 
but the injury exists nonetheless. For example, consider adultery, which 
has largely ceased to support a civil claim,100 but creates unquestionable 
harm. If a plaintiff brought a claim for adultery, the court could not dismiss 
it for lack of standing, but could dismiss it for failure to state a claim. 
Legislative enactments granting rights are “instructive and 
important,” but they do not mean “that a plaintiff automatically satisfies 
the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a 
statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that 
right.”101 
To apply these tests, it is helpful to divide the field into three 
partitions: definite injury, possible injury, and no injury. If common law 
has traditionally recognized a cause of action, then it is a definite injury. 
If neither the common law nor common sense recognize a cause of action, 
then it is definitely not an injury, even if the legislature says it is. If the 
common law has not traditionally recognized a cause, but recognizes 
similar causes of action, then it is a possible injury. When common law 
causes of action harmonize with statutory causes of action, even if they do 
not align precisely, courts seem particularly likely to find an injury-in-
fact.102 The common law history demonstrates that a type of harm exists, 
though congressional action recognizes or respects a new aspect of it. 
Applying these considerations to intrusions on confidential 
information, we find ample support in both history and statute for 
protecting privacy rights. 
On the historical front, privacy invasions have been broadly accepted 
as a basis for civil suit for more than a hundred years. Though privacy 
protections have ancient roots in property and tort law, recognition of their 
importance in and of themselves has usually been traced to Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis’s seminal article The Right to Privacy.103 In that 
article, Warren and Brandeis articulated the fundamental idea that privacy 
was worth protecting.104 From that central idea, privacy torts developed, 
 
100. See Joanna L. Grossman & Lawrence M. Friedman, Elizabeth Edwards v. 
Andrew Young: Can He Be Held Liable for Contributing to the Failure of the Edwardses’ 
Marriage?, (Feb. 19, 2010), https://bit.ly/3bwiYY2 (“[O]ver the course of the Twentieth 
Century, heart-balm laws were abolished virtually everywhere in America.”).  
101. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
102. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Even if there 
are differences between FCRA’s cause of action and those recognized at common law, the 
relevant point is that Congress has chosen to protect against a harm that is at least closely 
similar in kind to others that have traditionally served as the basis for lawsuit.”). 
103. See Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 220 (1890). 
104. See id. at 196 (“[T]he question whether our law will recognize and protect the 
right to privacy in this and in other respects must soon come before our courts for 
consideration. Of the desirability—indeed of the necessity—of some such protection, there 
can, it is believed, be no doubt.”). 
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courts and legislatures accepted them, and eventually, Professor William 
Prosser recognized them as a distinct group. Prosser identified actions for 
intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, publicity 
which places the plaintiff in a false light, and appropriation of name or 
likeness.105 In addition to Prosser’s recognized torts, other confidentiality 
protections have long received protection, like trade secret law.106 
The common law does not recognize a tort for reading a person’s 
private documents held by another, but it does recognize adjacent torts for 
privacy violations. With the general category having several accepted 
injuries, legislative judgment plays a particularly important role in 
recognizing new injuries with the same basic character. On the legislative 
front, Congress determined in the CFAA to extend both criminal and civil 
liability merely for reading data that was accessed without 
authorization.107 Additionally, both Congress and state legislatures have 
extended trade secret protection and liability for Prosser’s privacy torts. 
And yet the courts addressing the issue have frequently determined 
that a data breach standing alone does not create a present harm. They 
point to various reasons for this conclusion. Some courts note that the 
states generally eschew a personal right of action for data breaches, instead 
permitting enforcement only by the state attorney general.108 Others point 
to a requirement to demonstrate actual damages, as opposed to a bare 
statutory violation.109 (Of course, if a plaintiff can demonstrate actual 
damages independent of the claimed statutory violation, then they have an 
injury-in-fact.) Courts have likewise rejected secondary effects like 
emotional upset and fear of identity theft and fraud.110 
Thus, it seems that injury-in-fact for the person storing data on a 
system should turn on the data’s nature. If a third party surreptitiously 
reads my high school book report, it might cause me to cringe, but it would 
 
105. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
106. See Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250 
(1905) (“[P]laintiff’s collection of quotations is entitled to the protection of the law. It 
stands like a trade secret. Plaintiff is entitled to keep the work which it has done, or paid 
for doing, to itself.”). 
107. See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2484 
(explaining that “obtaining information” in statute included “mere observation of the 
data”); Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1276 (N.D. 
Iowa 2000).  
108. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(pointing to the Attorney General enforcement provision from Indiana’s data breach law 
as evidence that no compensable injury occurred).  
109. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 695 (7th Cir. 2015). 
110. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 272 (4th Cir. 2017) (“We also reject the 
Plaintiffs’ claim that ‘emotional upset’ and ‘fear [of] identity theft and financial fraud’ 
resulting from the data breaches are ‘adverse effects’ sufficient to confer Article III 
standing.”). But see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that a plaintiff who alleged “generalized anxiety and stress” after a data breach 
had claimed sufficient injury to confer standing).  
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cause insufficient harm to enable me to sue. On the other hand, if a third 
party read and threatened to disseminate my confidential business plan, it 
would cause me less embarrassment than having my adolescent writing 
exposed to the world, but it would cause the right type of harm to enable 
me to sue. But that presents a relatively immediate harm, a direct threat 
that would damage me economically. What if the perpetrator downloaded 
significant quantities of data, with my business plan being only one small 
piece, and he has made no threats? Then we have a potential future injury. 
2. Future Injury 
In future harm cases, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s actions 
make it likely that something terrible will befall the plaintiff in the future. 
The Supreme Court has explained that either a “substantial risk”111 of 
injury or a “certainly impending” injury has sufficient concreteness to 
support federal standing.112 
In data breach cases, plaintiffs frequently claim that the impending 
future harm of identity theft confers standing. But the courts are split. 
Some say that the data breach itself provides sufficient risk for future 
identity theft to confer standing.113 As the Seventh Circuit put it: “Why 
else would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’ 
private information?”114 Other courts believe that finding impending harm 
here requires assuming that the thief targeted personal data, selected the 
specific plaintiff’s personal data, and can use that data successfully for 
identity theft.115 These courts conclude that Clapper v. Amnesty 
International USA forecloses this “attenuated chain.”116 When the plaintiff 
brings CFAA claims rooted in future rather than present harm, it seems 
likely that courts will split along the same lines. 
 
111. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (“An allegation 
of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or if there is 
a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 
1138, 1150 n.5 (2013) (“Our cases do not uniformly require that it is literally certain that 
the harms they identify will come about. In some instances, we have found standing based 
on a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably 
incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.”); see also Attias v. Carefirst, 865 F.3d 620, 627 
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (“In Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, the Court clarified that a plaintiff 
can establish standing by satisfying either the ‘certainly impending’ test or the ‘substantial 
risk’ test. See 134 S. Ct. at 2341.”). 
112. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143. The Court also held that unless the future harm was 
“certainly impending,” plaintiffs could not manufacture standing by spending on goods 
and services to avoid the hypothetical future harm. Id.  
113. See, e.g., Attias, 865 F.3d at 629; Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
114. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
115. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275 (4th Cir. 2017); Reilly v. Ceridian 
Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011). 
116. Beck, 848 F.3d at 275. 
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B. Causation 
The causation requirement ensures that the defendant accused of 
causing the injury has wronged the plaintiff in such a way to give rise to a 
case or controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant.117 Causation 
problems arise when too many speculative steps intervene between the 
defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s harm. For example, in Simon v. 
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, the plaintiffs claimed that 
changing IRS rulings allowed hospitals to refuse indigent patients.118 On 
that basis, indigent patient plaintiffs and their community organizations 
sued the IRS.119 The Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ injury was not 
fairly traceable to the IRS, offering two reasons. First, changing the tax 
rules may or may not have induced hospitals to stop taking indigent 
patients.120 Second, changing the rules back may or may not cause 
hospitals to start taking indigent patients.121 
Causation concerns should not normally impede a CFAA claim. To 
the extent an injury exists, it arises from the violator accessing confidential 
documents. No speculative causal chain or intervening decisionmaker 
arises from the facts. 
C. Redressability 
Redressability ensures that the court examining the case or 
controversy can materially resolve the plaintiff’s injury.122 Redressability 
concerns usually arise in two circumstances. 
First, where an independent cause will continue inflicting a plaintiff’s 
injury even after the case resolves, the court cannot redress the plaintiff’s 
injury. For example, in Harp Advertising Ill. Inc. v. Village of Chicago 
Ridge, the plaintiff wanted to erect a sign that violated multiple local 
ordinances.123 The plaintiff unwisely challenged the constitutionality of 
 
117. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (the injury must 
be “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant”).  
118. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 28–33 (1976). 
119. See id. at 28. 
120. See id. at 42–43 (“It is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified 
in the complaint fairly can be traced to petitioners’ ‘encouragement’ or instead result from 
decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications.”). 
121. See id. at 43 (“It is equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the court’s 
remedial powers in this suit would result in the availability to respondents of such services. 
So far as the complaint sheds light, it is just as plausible that the hospitals to which 
respondents may apply for service would elect to forgo favorable tax treatment to avoid 
the undetermined financial drain of an increase in the level of uncompensated services.”). 
While similar to the causation analysis, this actually seems to sound in redressability. 
122. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998) (“And third, 
there must be redressability—a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged 
injury.”). 
123. See Harp Advert. Ill. Inc. v. Vill. of Chi. Ridge, 9 F.3d 1290, 1291 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
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some, but not all, these ordinances. The Seventh Circuit explained that this 
prevented the federal courts from offering the plaintiff, Harp Advertising, 
any redress for its injury: “Harp suffers an injury (it can’t erect the 
proposed billboard), but winning the case will not alter that situation.”124 
Second, where satisfaction will not flow to the plaintiff, the court 
cannot redress the plaintiff’s injuries. For example, in Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for a Better Environment, the Supreme Court held that a citizens’ group 
could not obtain redress for an environmental reporting violation.125 The 
defendant had fixed its reporting violations before the suit was filed and 
seemed unlikely to re-offend.126 The Court held that injunctive relief could 
not resolve a non-existent problem.127 Meanwhile, damages under the 
relevant statute were payable only to the U.S. Treasury, and therefore 
would not remediate the plaintiff’s injury.128 
The CFAA raises neither redressability concern. It provides for civil 
damages to the complainant.129 While a plaintiff cannot force the 
defendant to un-read its confidential documents, the plaintiff can punish 
the defendant’s transgression. 
V. CLARIFYING THE AMBIGUITY 
The CFAA has a tension at its core. It is fundamentally a cyber-
trespass law, but liability often triggers not when an attacker breaks in, but 
when that attacker obtains information from the breached system.130 This 
creates substantial confusion. System owners grant or withhold 
authorization to access systems. System owners are the gatekeepers. And 
often system owners are the victims. Whenever a bad actor targets 
company secrets on company servers, the CFAA’s concepts of access, 
authorization, and harm align. 
But when bad actors target a server to steal a third party’s confidential 
documents, these concepts clash. Theofel v. Farey-Jones131 and other 
current case law grant standing to the third party. But these cases never 
acknowledge that the third party has no authority under the CFAA to 
withhold authorization to access the documents. Nor, surprisingly, does 
the third party have the authority to grant authorization, even to access its 
own documents. Only the system owner has that power. At a minimum, 
 
124. Id. at 1292.  
125. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 87–88, 109–10. 
126. See id. at 87–88, 108. 
127. See id. at 108–09. 
128. See id. at 106. 
129. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2018) (“Any person 
who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil 
action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other 
equitable relief.”). 
130. See supra notes 16–19. 
131. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2003).  
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this creates strange tensions within the statute. When recast into a standing 
inquiry, these tensions raise real questions about the scope of victims 
Congress intended to benefit with the CFAA. Congress could prudently 
clarify the ambiguity, either removing third-party standing or more fully 
embracing digital ownership. 
The simplest route would have Congress definitively foreclose third-
party standing. The CFAA would revert to its intended role as a cyber-
trespass law. To accomplish this, Congress need only alter a few words in 
the statute. The civil action provision currently says: “Any person who 
suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation . . . .”132 Congress could 
instead say: “Any person who controls authorization and suffers damage 
or loss by reason of a violation . . . .” This modification would prevent 
third parties from bringing CFAA claims. Third parties would remain free 
to invoke federal trade secret law or state causes of action if they qualify 
for them.133 But third parties would no longer have an easy claim when a 
hacker breaks into a system the third party does not even own.  
Alternatively, Congress could move fully toward protecting digital 
ownership. Both Congress and the states have been inching in this 
direction. In 2016 Congress nationalized trade secret protection for the 
first time.134 The states have also moved to stronger privacy protections.135 
But embracing broad federal privacy protections would require 
massively overhauling existing law. Congress would need to consider 
which documents were sufficiently confidential to require protection. For 
example, it would need to evaluate the traditional privacy torts and 
determine how this new legislation interfaced with existing trade secret 
protections. But each step carries risks. To effect its purpose, Congress 
may need to define property rights. This role traditionally belongs to the 
States, with Congress legislating on top of those existing definitions.136 By 
imposing a blanket federal standard on a quickly evolving field, Congress 
could hamstring innovation and inhibit individuals and companies from 
voting with their feet. If Congress embraces the same access and 
authorization structure from the current CFAA, it would need to clarify 
what is being accessed and who can authorize it. The fact that Congress 
did none of this in the current CFAA raises further questions about the 
broad third-party standing that courts have thus far granted. 
 
132. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2018). 
133. Litigants are not shy about bringing such claims alongside CFAA violations. See 
Jonathan Mayer, Cybercrime Litigation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1489 (2016) (detailing 
frequency of co-claims in CFAA litigation). 
134. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 
(2016). 
135. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ. Code 1798.100 (2019). 
136. Cf. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 347 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Congress did not 
pass a federal body of trust law, estate law, or property law when enacting Medicaid. It 
relied and continues to rely on state laws governing such issues.”). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Third-party standing under the CFAA creates a bizarre situation. 
System owners authorize (or decline to authorize) users. Current case law 
says that if a hacker intrudes on the system, anyone storing a document 
there—any employee, any vendor, any customer, any user—may have a 
cause of action. But a party’s interest in protecting confidential documents 
falls well outside the zone of interests that the CFAA protects. Taken to 
the extreme, with non-confidential documents, or confidential documents 
that a hacker may only discover after wading through a deep haystack, 
even the Constitution may not recognize an injury. Due to the disconnect 
between the system (which suffered the intrusion) and the actual claimed 
damage (viewing confidential files), CFAA cases with third-party 
standing may further contort the law on access and authorization. 
Regardless of whether Congress decides to broadly protect digital 
ownership—though that seems unlikely and perhaps unwise—Congress 
should clarify that the CFAA does not grant third-party standing. 
